In this book, the author explores the underlying spiritual understanding of narcissism. He presents a detailed map of the steps involved in working through barriers that prevent us from recognizing the most essential nature of our true identity.
Is Christ worth pursuing? Is faith worth saving, worth fighting for? The Point of Faith is for the Christ seeker on all stages of the journey, seeking to strengthen their understanding against the onslaught of anti-Christian thought. The Barna group stated 73% of Americans identify as Christian and that faith is personally important to them. Yet only a small portion have a biblical worldview or paradigm. This book is an invitation to free the mind from assumption, step back and examine the viewpoint of Christ and the Bible. If we think of life as a journey, then we see that for the Christian, Atheist, and Agnostic alike, each use a kind of road map, or paradigm as a guide. It is my assertion that each of these worldviews is based on some degree of faith, trust, or belief. If ones paradigm fails to guide them to a good destination, then what good is it? I believe we need to ask what I call the seven fundamental questions of life, which are: Identity, origin, meaning, purpose, ethical value, love, and consciousness. These questions apply to any worldview. I believe through the recovery of true, Biblical faith that Christ will transform lives. Christs own words bid us; I came that they may have life and have it in abundance. 10:10.
This essay reconstructs Schelling's philosophical development during the years 1794-1800. It emphasizes the role of Kant's heritage within Schelling's early philosophy, and the strong relationship between Schelling and Hölderlin during their Tübingen years. The central question it explores is how the Absolute relates to Finiteness - a relation that constitutes the basis of transcendental idealism as well as the essence of a transcendental philosophy, here radically understood as a philosophy of finitude and as a critical aesthetics. The essay shows the young Schelling as he presents a rich and novel field of inquiry, which provides a credible and engaging alternative to Hegelian thinking and anticipates themes from twentieth-century philosophy (Phenomenology, Existentialism, Critical Thinking). The volume thus provides both a historical and a contemporary look at Schelling's early philosophy, and at its original and speculative approach.
What does the idea of taking 'the point of view of the universe' tell us about ethics? The great nineteenth-century utilitarian Henry Sidgwick used this metaphor to present what he took to be a self-evident moral truth: the good of one individual is of no more importance than the good of any other. Ethical judgments, he held, are objective truths that we can know by reason. The ethical axioms he took to be self-evident provide a foundation for utilitarianism. He supplements this foundation with an argument that nothing except states of consciousness have ultimate value, which led him to hold that pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically good. Are these claims defensible? Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer test them against a variety of views held by contemporary writers in ethics, and conclude that they are. This book is therefore a defence of objectivism in ethics, and of hedonistic utilitarianism. The authors also explore, and in most cases support, Sidgwick's views on many other key questions in ethics: how to justify an ethical theory, the significance of an evolutionary explanation of our moral judgments, the choice between preference-utilitarianism and hedonistic utilitarianism, the conflict between self-interest and universal benevolence, whether something that it would be wrong to do openly can be right if kept secret, how demanding utilitarianism is, whether we should discount the future, or favor those who are worse off, the moral status of animals, and what is an optimum population.
The Star of Redemption, * which presents Franz Rosenzweig's system of philosophy, begins with the sentence "from death, (vom Tode) , from the fear of death, originates all cognition of the All" and concludes with the words "into life. " This beginning and this conclusion of the book signify more than the first and last words of philosophical books usually do. Taken together - "from death into life" - they comprise the entire meaning of Rosenzweig's philosophy. The leitmotif of this philosophy is the life and death of the human being and not the I of philosophical idealism, where man ultimately signifies "for ethics" no more than" . . . a point to which it (ethics) relates its problems, as for science also he (man) is only a particular case of its general laws. "l Rosenzweig deals with the individual's actual existence, that which is termi nated by death; he speaks of the individual's hic et nunc, of his actions and decisions in the realm of concrete reality. This philosophy is not an exposition of theoretical principles. It is not concerned with man in general in abstract time, but rather with the individual human being, designated by a proper name, living in his particular time. ** Human existence in its finiteness and temporalness forms the focus in which Rosenzweig's motif can be gathered together.
The writings of Kierkegaard continue to be a fertile source for con temporary philosophical thought. Perhaps the most interesting of his works to a philosopher is the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments. The Fragments is a brief, algebraic piece in which the author attempts to put forward the central teachings of Christianity in philosophical terminology. The. work is addressed to a reader who has a philosophical bent and who may therefore be tempted to relate to Christianity via such questions as: Can the truth of Christian ity be established? The analysis of the Fragments establishes that this way of relating to Christianity is misguided, since Christianity and phil osophy are categorically different. Having done this, the author turns his attention in the Postscript to the question of how an individual human being can properly establish a relationship to Christianity. In order to become a Christian, one must first of all exist. "Nothing more than thatP' one may be tempted to think. Yet at the very core of the Postscript is the notion that to exist as an individual human being is difficult. The author goes so far as to claim that men have forgotten what it means to exist.
Abū’l-Barakāt is often considered one of the most comprehensive philosophers of the Arabic-Jewish milieu in the medieval age. His extensive and unique philosophical theories, especially his theories in the particular sciences, were seen as a major challenge for the traditional conceptions of the Aristotelian school of thought during and after this period. ‘Abū’l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s Scientific Philosophy’ explores the core material of Abū’l-Barakāt’s scientific studies, found in his magnum opus the Kitāb al-Mu‘tabar. The book then locates these scientific theories within Abū’l-Barakāt’s philosophy more widely. Whilst providing a comprehensive critique of ancient philosophy, including the work of Aristotle, certain affinities between Abū’l-Barakāt’s work and that of more modern scientific conceptions are also examined. Containing vast amounts of previously untranslated text, ‘Abū’l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s Scientific Philosophy’ sheds new light on the philosopher’s scientific theories, particularly with regards to his logical conceptions. For this reason, the book will be a valuable resource for students and scholars of Jewish and Islamic Philosophy, whilst the scientific material will appeal to those studying the history of science.
The general view of Russell's work amongst philosophers has been that repeat edly, during his long and distinguished career, crucial changes of mind on fun damental points were significant enough to cause him to successively adopt a diversity of radically new philosophical positions. Thus Russell is seen to have embraced and then abandoned, amongst others, neo-Hegelianism, Platonic re alism, phenomenalism and logical atomism, before settling finally on a form of neutral monism that philosophers have generally found to be incredible. This view of Russell is captured in C. D. Broad's famous remark that "Mr. Russell pro duces a different system of philosophy every few years . . . " (Muirhead, 1924: 79). Reflecting this picture of Russell continually changing his position, books and papers on Russell's philosophy have typically belonged to one of two kinds. Either they have concentrated on particular periods of his thought that are taken to be especially significant, or, accepting the view of his successive conversion to dis tinctly different philosophical positions, they have provided some account of each of these supposedly disconnected periods of his thought. While much good work has been done on Russell's philosophy, this framework has had its limitations, the main one being that it conceals the basic continuity behind his thought.